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Refuse and the ‘Risk Society’: The Political Ecology of Risk in Inter-war Britain 
 
Summary 
 
This article responds to current critiques of Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis by 
historians of science and medicine. Those who have engaged with the concept of 
risk society have been content to accept the fundamental categories of Beck’s 
analysis. In contrast, we argue that Beck’s risk society thesis underplays two key 
themes. Firstly, the role of capitalist social relations as the driver of technological 
change and the transformation of everyday life; and secondly, the ways in which 
hegemonic discourses of risk can be appropriated and transformed by counter-
hegemonic forces. In place of ‘risk society’ we propose an approach based upon a 
‘political ecology of risk’, which emphasises the social relations that that are 
foundational to the everyday politics of environmental health.  
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars interested in the relations between environmental change and the histories 
of science, medicine and health have been attracted to Ulrich Beck’s idea of the ‘risk 
society’ as a way of understanding the emergence of concerns with environment, 
pollution and health.1 Some of this attention has been quite critical; particularly 
regarding the chronology Beck applies to the emergence of ‘reflexivity’ within risk 
society. For instance, David F. Smith has critically reassessed the emergence of risk 
                                                          
1 Greg Mitman, Michelle Murphy and Christopher Sellers, ‘Introduction: A Cloud over 
History’, Osiris, 2004, 19, 1-17, 14-16. 
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society in the context of the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak of 1964, and has suggested 
that there are difficulties with the idea that the risk society presents a distinctive 
historical conjuncture.2 Jean-Baptiste Fressoz has pointed to the presence of 
concerns about environmental catastrophe and the regulation of scientific progress 
in mid-nineteenth century France.3 Such critical engagements only go so far 
however, and in some respect fail to hit their mark. For instance, Beck recognises 
that risk in itself has indeed been a universal characteristic of modernity.4 For Beck it 
is not merely the recognition of production of risk as a response to technological 
change which is the key to risk society. Rather, risk society forms a distinct historical 
epoch because of two new characteristics that have emerged from within the social 
relations of risk: the individuation of risks within society in general, and the 
monopolisation of the right to determine acceptable risk by scientific experts. Any 
critical engagement with risk also needs to engage with these specific categories of 
analysis. 
 
                                                          
2 David F Smith, ‘Food Panics in History: Corned Beef, Typhoid and “Risk Society”’, Journal 
of Epidemiology and Community Health, 2007, 61, 566-70. 
3 Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, ‘Beck Back in the Nineteenth Century: Towards a Genealogy of 
Risk Society’, History and Technology, 2007, 23, 333-350; Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, ‘The Gas 
Lighting Controversy: Technological Risk, Expertise and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century 
Paris and London, Urban History, 2007, 33, 729-755. See also the more recent contribution 
on environmental reflexivity which develops these arguments further:  Fabien Locher and 
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, ‘Modernity’s Frail Climate: A Climate History of Environmental 
Reflexivity, Critical Inquiry, 2012, 38, 579-598. 
4 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 51. 
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In his book, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Ulrich Beck proposes that the 
post-war period has seen a movement from a classically modern period of ‘industrial 
modernisation’, based on the positive production of social ‘goods’, toward an era of 
‘reflexive modernisation’, in which governments increasingly seek to assess and 
mitigate the negative consequences of industrial and technological transformation.5 
Risk society, Beck argues, emerges from the tripartite interaction of the productive 
forces, scientific knowledge, and governance:  
 
Risks presume industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and 
considerations of utility. They differ from ‘war damage’ by their ‘normal birth’, 
or more precisely, their ‘peaceful origins’ in the centres of rationality and 
prosperity with the blessings of the guardians of law and order. They differ 
from pre-industrial natural disasters by their origins in decision-making, which 
is of course never conducted by individuals but by entire organisations and 
political groups.6 
 
At the heart of Beck’s conception of the risk society is a normative critique of late-
modernity.7 Beck claims that the changing power relations that result from the 
emergence of risk society constitute a challenge to traditional notions of democratic 
citizenship. In contrast to the social risks of high modernity (disease, unemployment), 
                                                          
5 Beck, Risk Society; Ulrich Beck ‘From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of 
Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment’, Theory, Culture and Society, 1992, 
9, 97-123. 
6 Beck, ‘Industrial Society’, 98. 
7 Beck, Risk Society, 19. 
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techno-scientific risks are individuated; artificially produced chemical toxins, for 
example, attack an individual body based upon the partly unpredictable 
characteristics of place and materiality, as much as by social class or national 
population. Risks are ‘somehow universal and unspecific’.8 Within the post-industrial 
order, however, the significance of particular hazards are identified and measured by 
specialist knowledge producers who determine both what is an acceptable risk and 
the technical modes of measuring and mitigating hazards.9 Beck is critical of what he 
terms the ‘technological moralisation’ of the decision-making processes, that is, the 
removal of risk from democratic (i.e. properly political) decision-making processes 
through the application of the techniques of control.10 The risk society is, from this 
point of view, pre-eminently a political structure, and the risk society concept is, 
therefore, a political critique that posits a late-modernity that is part of a post-political 
order of technological decision-making. 
 
The risk society thesis, as propounded by Beck, provides us with a powerful 
sociological tool for the critique of modern techno-scientific societies. It should be 
read alongside other such critiques such as Foucault’s influential investigations of 
the disciplinary worlds of ‘biopolitics’ and ‘governmentality’.11  There are also 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 53. 
9 Ibid, 51-84. 
10 Beck, ‘Industrial Society’, 99. 
11 Although it is arguably differentiated by its emphasis on materiality and the agency of 
matter in the production of risk, a subject that has recently been expanded upon by the ‘new-
materialisms’. See Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Diana H. Coole  and Samantha Frost, eds, The New 
Materialisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010)   
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parallels with Latour’s investigation of networks of scientific knowledge production 
and socialisation in Beck’s emphasis on the relations between scientific knowledge 
production and the normalisation of risk production through forms of political 
organisation.12 Historians have not, however, directed much specific critical attention 
to the conceptual apparatus upon which Beck’s claims rest. There are, however, 
solid empirical grounds for such a critique. Here, we focus on two categories in 
particular, which we wish to put to the test in a concrete historical context. 
 
The first category is the concept of ‘individuation’. In his analysis Beck makes a 
number of assumptions about the nature of the material interactions between 
technologies and humans. Individuation is rooted for Beck in the changing dynamics 
of labor exploitation in post-industrial societies, as the collective experiences of class 
in the workplace are undermined.13 In contrast, Beck argues that the unforeseen 
effects of technological decisions (pollutants, toxins, radioactivity) individuate risk in 
the relation of human body to environment, “Objectively, however, risks display an 
equalising effect within their scope and among those affected by them. It is precisely 
therein that their novel political power resides”.14 Reducing this to a formula, Beck 
continues, “poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic”, that is the materiality of 
exposure to risk is in some way no longer confined to class but becomes 
                                                          
12 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurisation of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (trans), 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993 edn.) 
13 Beck, Risk, p. 88 
14 Ibid, p. 35. 
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generalised.15 Beck therefore concludes that risk society therefore moves ‘beyond 
status and class’, although it does not replace them.16  
 
What this perspective arguably omits, however, is sufficient reflection on the socio-
spatial dynamics of technological change and their historical specificity, themes that 
have been of particular interest to both environmental justice activists and critical 
geographers.17 Beck’s argument tends to focus on changes in the productive forces 
(technologies) and relations of production rather than the wider social relations of 
production that are revealed in the form of those technologies at the level of 
everyday life. It is by this method that he reduces Marxist analysis to the analysis of 
class collectivities in the workplace. However, the social relations of capitalism 
cannot be reduced to class relations because they also involve wider structural 
inequalities that emerge from the requirement to reproduce, circulate, and consume 
value on a daily basis.18 This is the sphere of ‘everyday life’ that has been expanded 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Beck, Risk Society, 99-101. 
17 Michael K Heiman, ‘Race, Waste and Class: New Perspectives on Environmental Justice’, 
Antipode, 1996, 28, 111-121; Risa Whitson, ‘Negotiating Place and Value: Geographies of 
Waste and Scavenging in Buenos Aires’, Antipode, 2011, 43, 1404-1433; Michelle Yates, 
‘The Human-As-Waste, the Labor Theory of Value and Disposability in Contemporary 
Capitalism’, Antipode, 2011, 43, 1679-1695. 
18 Christopher Sellers and Joseph Melling, ‘Towards a transnational industrial-hazard history: 
charting the circulation of workplace dangers and expertise’, British Society for the History of 
Science, 2012, 45, 401-424. 
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upon by Henri Lefebvre among others.19 In what follows we try to demonstrate how 
the risk society thesis might be enriched by taking into account everyday life.  
 
The second key category of analysis is that of the knowledge dependence of the 
production of risk, and the monopoly power this gives to scientists in determining 
acceptable risk.20 Here, Beck argues that science operates reflexively, as the limits 
of scientific knowledge assert themselves in the emergence of previously unknown 
risks that challenge claims that particular techniques are safe. Science thus works to 
delegitimise itself, or, as Beck articulates it, science ‘has become indispensable to 
and incapabale of truth’.21 This account of the reflexivity of scientific knowledge is 
central to Beck’s account of risk society, as well as to his more hopeful claims for the 
possible emergence of a public sphere more attuned to ambiguity, unknowability and 
the critique of values. While, in so far as risks represent the consequences of 
industrial, techno-scientific choices, this may seem reasonable, it nonetheless 
implies that risk society rests primarily upon the immanent contradictions of scientific 
knowledge production. This ‘idealism’ is in tension with the more materialist aspects 
of Beck’s account, and Beck does not account for the ways in which the choice of 
technologies can themselves ‘reveal’, as Marx puts it, ‘the active relation of man to 
nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare 
                                                          
19 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Live: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday, 3 
vols (1947,1962, 1981),  II. Alex Loftus, Everyday Environmentalism: Creating an Urban 
Political Ecology (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). 
20 Beck, Risk, 26 
21 Beck, Risk Society, 166. 
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the process of the production of the social relations of his life’.22 We shall attempt to 
partly fill this gap, but suggesting that an analysis which places scientific discourse 
within a wider ‘semantic field’ of the everyday, can throw light on the tensions, 
contestations and failures of scientific knowledge production. 
 
Historians who have engaged with the risk society have yet to respond to the political 
consequences of Beck’s account of risk society. This has important implications for 
the work of historians because, if we assume that technologies, and their associated 
risks, reveal social relations, then we might also reasonably ask whether Beck’s 
account may hide a much more contested and multi-faceted understanding of the 
composition and decomposition of scientific understanding in particular historical 
contexts.  An emphasis on the social relations within which risk emerges should also 
enable a renewed critique of Beck’s normative political assumptions. Central to 
Beck’s normative political agenda is the claim that the monopolisation of the right to 
decide upon acceptable risk is in conflict with the norms of democratic citizenship 
and the requirements of an open public discourse. His argument rests upon the idea 
that the seemingly unquestionable legitimacy of scientific expertise in post-industrial 
societies allows experts to claim authority over competing truth claims. Historians 
have an important contribution to make by testing the accuracy of this claim by 
paying attention to the competing claims around risk and health in particular 
historical contexts.   
 
                                                          
22 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume one, Ben Fowkes (trans), 
(London: Penguin, 1976 edn.) 493. 
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 In this article we seek to engage directly with the normative social and political 
claims that Beck makes by investigating those claims in the context of the inter-war 
refuse crisis in Britain. We do not ask when risk society emerged, but rather whether 
the concept itself is adequate to the task of understanding what is at stake in political 
struggles over techno-scientific risks. We choose to approach those struggles as 
hegemonic struggles embedded in social relations of a kind to which we believe 
Beck fails to give sufficient weight. We see the politics of risk as embodying not 
merely the political consequences of industrial or technological change, but also 
struggle over social power more widely, including conflict with the capitalist mode of 
production and its effect on the sphere of everyday life. We pay particular attention to 
the material and spatial elements in this process as determining forces in shaping 
discourse of risk and the technological fix. Furthermore, rather than privileging the 
production and contestation of scientific knowledge in itself, we attempt to put the 
operation of that knowledge into the context of the social relations of everyday life. 
We argue that attempts to legitimise certain technologies, rather than being seen as 
hegemonic discourses in isolation, were conducted on the basis of contested 
understandings of risk within a much wider ‘sematic field’ of the everyday. From 
within this field medical discourses of risk produced by expert knowledge were 
continuously rendered contradictory and threatened to fall apart. This had real 
effects on the forms that technological fixes to risk eventually take. Through a 
detailed empirical analysis of the politics of risk associated with urban refuse 
disposal in inter-war Britain, we seek to reconstruct the concept of the ‘risk society’, 
including its normative aspects, by integrating it with insights from Marxian  political 
ecology to produce a ‘political ecology of risk society’.23  
                                                          
23 Loftus, Everyday Environmentalism, 109-129 
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Britain’s Inter-war Waste Regime the Reproduction of Urban Space 
 
We have already indicated that it is necessary to approach the risk society thesis 
from an empirical point of view. We have chosen to do this through a case study of 
refuse disposal in early twentieth-century Britain. This is not simply an arbitrary 
choice. Waste is an excellent way of integrating an analysis of social relations into 
the analysis of risk, as it is central to the project of capitalist modernity. As John 
Scanlan has illustrated, the Enlightenment was itself constituted by the category of 
waste as the cutting away of useless knowledge, the separation of value from 
refuse.24 Waste disposal has been a consistently controversial source of risk 
throughout industrial and late-industrial modernity.25 Technologies of waste disposal 
have been opposed throughout on grounds of the risks they pose to health and 
environment. However, too often historians have been content to regard waste 
disposal as a purely technological, ‘end-of-pipe’ problem, isolated from its constituent 
role in social life. Environmental histories have emphasised the materiality of waste 
as an objective environmental ‘problem’ and the technological ‘search for the 
ultimate sink’.26 However, wasting is as much about the production of urban space 
                                                          
24 John Scanlan, On Garbage, (London: Reaktion, 2005). 
25 Timothy Cooper, 'Modernity and the politics of waste in Britain', in P. Warde and S. 
Soerlin, eds, Nature's End: History and the Environment (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 247-272. 
26 Bill Luckin, ‘Pollution in the City, in M. Daunton, ed., Cambridge Urban History of Britain, 
Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 207-28; Martin Melosi, The 
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as about the material results of consumption.27 The daily reproduction of the city as a 
lived environment within which social relations can recur requires a continuous 
process of responding to the flow of matter through the city. The materiality of waste 
disposal is therefore inherently linked to a wider process of the reproduction of social 
relations. Christopher Hamlin’s work on public health and social justice is an 
excellent example of this, demonstrating that the remaking of urban environments 
legitimates social order and reproduces the conditions of possibility for capital 
accumulation.28  
 
Wasting is, therefore, an act of social reproduction. As Zsusza Gille has 
demonstrated our ways of wasting are themselves historically contingent on 
networks of discourse, technology and political economy that form particular historic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sanitary City: Environmental Service in Urban America (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University 
Press, 2008); Joel Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Industrial Pollution in Historical 
Perspective (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 1996) 
27 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008). 
28 Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Christopher Hamlin ‘Providence and Putrefaction: 
Victorian Sanitarians and the Natural Theology of Health and Disease, Victorian Studies, 
1985, 28, 381-411. For an introduction to the relations between wasting and changing 
consumer habits see: Susan Strasser, Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash (New 
York: Henry Holt Books, 1999), also, Helen Rogers, Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of 
Garbage (New York: The New Press, 2005). 
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‘waste regimes’.29 Nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain has, arguably, seen a 
number of different such waste regimes based on different moral economies of 
wasting in which understandings of the risks to human health of disposal were 
central in moralising particular technologies of disposal. For example, the period 
between 1870 and 1914, which Bill Luckin has termed the ‘refuse revolution’, saw 
the municipalisation of waste collection and disposal, and the establishment of 
incineration as the preferred waste disposal technology in Britain. As a form of 
disposal the ‘dust-destructor’ (or incinerator) made sense in an urban energy regime 
that was based largely on coal and which produced a waste stream with a high 
content of unburnt cinders. Incineration was, however, also embedded in a particular 
medical discourse of risk that made sense of it as a technology. Sanitary accounts of 
disease dictated destruction of refuse by fire, which eliminated putrefactive 
substances and smell. As John F.M. Clark has shown, it was strongly promoted by 
Medical Officers of Health in urban local authorities before the First World War, and 
enjoyed a great deal of prestige among the profession.30 Challenges to incineration 
did arise from time to time among both the public and the medical profession 
particularly around the question of smoke pollution, so that careful ideological work 
had to be undertaken by Medical Officers of Health to legitimate incineration as the 
best way of eliminating risk from putrefactive substances. We can understand the 
ideal pre-1914 system as a particular ‘waste regime’ built upon an expert sanitary 
                                                          
29 Zsuzsa Gille, From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: The Politics of Waste 
in Socialist and Post-Socialist Hungary (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
30 John F.M. Clark, ‘‘‘The Incineration of Refuse is Beautiful”. Torquay and the Introduction of 
Municipal Refuse Destructors’, Urban History, 2007, 34, 255-77. 
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discourse of risk emerging from the presence of putrefactive substances in refuse, 
and whose preferred technological fix was the dust-destructor. 
 
This waste regime was challenged by the consequences of war and post-war social 
and economic change. The period between the world wars was a period of both 
change and stability on the urban metabolism of British cities. At one level the 
energy regimes of cities remained founded on coal, which generated large amounts 
of waste cinders and ashes. There were few fundamental changes in the waste 
stream of the kind that would be characteristic of the classic age of post-war 
consumption.31 Electrification and the introduction of the national grid were beginning 
to change this energy regime, and the geographical distribution of its waste products, 
but the full effects of this would not be felt until the revolution in domestic energy use 
after the Clean Air Act of 1956.32 Between 1926 and 1934, when the Ministry of 
Health first began collecting national statistics on the refuse collection and disposal, 
the results showed that the average weight of refuse produce per thousand of the 
population remained remarkably constant.33  The daily reproduction of urban space 
therefore remained predicated on disposal of large quantities of ashes from domestic 
fires, on top of large quantities of other household and trade refuse.  
 
                                                          
31 Timothy Cooper, ‘War on Waste? The Politics of Waste and Recycling in Post-War Britain, 
1950-1975’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2009, 53-73. 
32 Brian Clapp, An Environmental History of Britain (London: Longman, 1994), 45-55. 
33 Public Cleansing: Extracts from the Annual Report of the Ministry of Health for 1926-27, 
HMSO 1937, 1935. 
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Changes waste disposal technologies in this period were not primarily driven by 
changes in the material character of the waste stream. Rather, the origins of Britain’s 
inter-war ‘waste crisis’ are to be found in the combination of economic crisis and the 
requirements of reproducing urban space. In the period of the ‘refuse revolution’, 
municipal waste disposal machinery was largely paid for through a relatively 
generous Local Government Board loans scheme.34 Although cost had always been 
an issue in local attitudes towards refuse disposal, in practice the question of the 
‘healthiest’ mode of disposal was often a determining issue before 1914. Even 
medium-sized municipal authorities were happy to invest in expensive new refuse 
disposal systems, in a way they would not do after 1919, and hundreds did so in the 
1890s and 1900s.35 However, in the era of Geddes Axe ‘austerity’ an increasingly 
parsimonious central government was alarmed by, and obsessed with, the cost of 
refuse disposal. ‘Economies’ in services such as refuse collection and disposal were 
to the fore in the minds of government officials, and this had important implications 
for public health choices. Where Medical Officers of Health had driven choices about 
refuse disposal technologies without significant regard to cost, the post-war period 
was increasingly dominated by the search for forms of refuse disposal that were both 
cheap and risk free. For the first time in the 1920s, central government began to 
publish a separate statistical account of the costs of refuse disposal based on the 
                                                          
34 Christine Bellamy, Administering Central-Local Relations, 1871-1919: The Local 
Government Board in its Fiscal and Cultural Context (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988). 
35 J.F.M Clark, ‘Incineration’, 264-5 
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Ministry’s Annual Report.36 This act of centralised data collection itself pointed 
towards a desire to discipline the costs of refuse collection and disposal in a way 
previous left to local politics. The ideology of ‘economy’ also increasingly determined 
the discursive frame in which decisions about the viability of technological choices 
were made. For example, relatively expensive technologies, such as dust-
destructors, which had been popular before the war, now faced increasing opposition 
from central government.37 This culture of ‘economy’ also extended a practical veto 
over programmatic suggestions for solving the urban refuse problem, which was 
most obvious in consistent failures to enact proposals for the centralisation of 
collection and disposal in major urban areas like London.38  
 
Concerns with the risk of waste disposal to public health increasingly had to 
accommodate themselves to the discourse of economy in this period. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the debate over the tipping of refuse. Incineration had 
been predicated on the idea that any tipping of putrefactive refuse was a negation of 
health and a significant risk to public well-being. In the inter-war era, tipping was 
looked to as the necessary cheap alternative to incineration. Some of the 
contradictions that arose from this are nicely illustrated by the arguments made at a 
                                                          
36 See the series, Ministry of Health, Public Cleansing: Extracts from the Annual Report of 
the Ministry of Health. The statistical series ran from at least 1926 to 1935, and was explicitly 
designed to enable a comparison between different municipal authorities so as to judge (and 
presumably also to discipline) expenditure. 
37 Timothy Cooper, ‘”Burying the refuse revolution”: The Rise of Controlled tipping in Britain, 
1920-1960’, Environment and Planning A, 2010, 42, 1033-1048. 
38 Mathew Gandy, Recycling and Waste: An Exploration of Contemporary Environmental 
Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1993), 72-77. 
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Ministry of Health conference on the subject in 1922. The conference had been 
called to discuss the problem of crude tipping of refuse on the suburban fringes of 
London. Alderman Dawson of Camberwell Metropolitan Borough, himself a 
proponent of a centralised scheme of refuse disposal for London, argued that a 
metropolitan waste disposal system should be founded on public health priorities not 
considerations of cost. A centralised system of waste collection and disposal should 
‘remove the whole to some place where it would not be offensive to anyone, but 
would be destroyed [incinerated] and save the health of the people’. 39Dawson 
attacked salvage (recycling) and tipping systems of the kind that had emerged during 
the First World War as unhealthy, and demanded centralised disposal by 
incineration:  
 
I value my health more than I do 2d on any rate. I think we ought to do it and I 
think it would go down to the credit of London that we have removed the last 
source of that which was going to blast the health of the people. I am proud of 
the fact that London is the healthiest city in the world, and I want to keep it so. 
We shall never do it by seeing how we can save on refuse; that will never 
do.40  
 
Dawson’s call for centralised waste collection and disposal based on incineration 
technology was, however, firmly rejected. The Ministry’s representative at the 
meeting, Mr. Gibbon, accepted that incineration may have had ‘its uses within certain 
                                                          
39 The National Archives (TNA), HLG 51/11 London Refuse Proceedings of a Conference, 
29 June 1922. 
40 Ibid. 
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well-defined limits’, but based on wartime experiments with new methods of tipping, 
‘experience shows that, with proper management, the tip can be rendered, not 
exactly an object of beauty or desire, but relatively harmless; in fact, I was told the 
other day of one place where on a tip actually now in use they did not breed a plague 
of rats, but rabbits.’41 Representing the urban borough of St Marylebone, Alderman 
Watson questioned whether urban incineration was not itself a hazard: ‘Borough 
Councils are left with 2 recourses, either to send the refuse into the country, which of 
course is the method of least resistance, or else to destroy it in destructors. We know 
that it is very difficult to attempt to consume or destroy house refuse in any crowded 
locality. It is not only difficult but insanitary and expensive’.42  
 
However, tipping refuse on the urban fringes faced some very severe challenges. In 
part this was due to the spatial transformation of urban areas. Suburban building was 
rapidly transforming Britain’s cities, and the dispersal of working-class urban 
populations to the, supposedly healthful, suburbs threw up new difficulties of waste 
disposal.43 London presented particular difficulties. By 1924, the combined 
metropolitan boroughs area were sending some 500,000 tons of house and trade 
refuse annually to dumping grounds in Essex and other extra-mural counties.44 
Before the First World War these so-called ‘crude dumps’ had been sited far enough 
                                                          
41 TNA HLG 51/11 London Refuse Proceedings of a Conference, 29 June 1922. 
42 TNA HLG 51/11 London Refuse Proceedings of a Conference, 29 June 1922. 
43 John Davis, ‘Modern London’, in P.J. Waller, ed, The English Urban Landscape (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 125-150. 
44 TNA, HLG 51/12, J.C. Dawes, Report on London Refuse for Ministry of Health, London 
Refuse Dumping on London Bank of Thames. 
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from significant urban development that they could at least be ignored, if not officially 
sanctioned. Post-war suburbanisation changed this, increasingly bringing the 
residents of new suburban housing estates into close proximity with such dumping 
grounds. One consequence of this was that refuse disposal became much more 
hotly contested. Uncontrolled tipping emerged as a concern in the national press. 
The Ministry of Health received regular communication from both local government 
and individuals. Fears surrounding the impact of exposure to dump sites on public 
health, largely built upon the putrefactive discourse of sanitary medicine, were 
central.  
 
The politicisation of waste disposal in this period, therefore arose partly out of 
changes in the spatial structure of urban areas, driven by the wider requirements of 
urban reproduction. The transformation of the debate around Britain waste disposal 
system in this period was driven not by a process of ‘individuation’ of the kind that 
Beck identities, but by the antinomies arising from the demands of reproducing urban 
space and the medical and ecological impact of the technologies that were designed 
to enable this. One particularly notorious example of these processes was presented 
by the Essex riverside tips. The London County Council’s showpiece estate at 
Becontree, an estate built with the express purpose of improving working-class living 
standards and health, was being constructed just north of Britain’s largest and most 
notorious crude refuse tip at South Hornchurch.45 In 1924 the London County 
Council wrote to the Ministry of Health complaining of the proximity of these dumps 
to the estate. Their letter observed tartly that in such a context, ‘the question of the 
                                                          
45 Andrej Olechnowicz, Working-class Housing Between the Wars: the Becontree Estate, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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continuance of the present method of disposal of house refuse is one which 
assumes a position of very great importance.’46 A subsequent investigation, 
undertaken in 1925 by the Ministry of Health’s Director of Public Cleansing Jesse 
Cooper Dawes, reported that:  
 
This was my first visit to these dumps and I was rather surprised to find the 
conditions so bad, especially at the City dump (Cory’s Lighterage Co. Ltd). No 
attempt whatever is made to “manage” either of them; long deep tipping faces 
are exposed; no part of the refuse is covered either on the slopes or surface; 
no leveling is done; fire is not taken note of (on the City dump), there is ample 
evidence of a huge rat population, and if the conditions I saw are those 
usually found in the warmer weather I can quite believe that the whole 
neighbourhood is fly infested.47 
 
It was not just a single dump that presented a problem. In 1920, Romford Urban 
District Council received two separate letters of complaint about the dumping of 
refuse from St Pancras on a disused brickfield in the area.48 Large quantities of 
refuse were being brought by rail, it stated, and the local Medical Officer of Health 
claimed that a great nuisance was likely to arise as a result.49 Not much appears to 
                                                          
46 TNA HLG 51/12 London Refuse Dumping, Letter from LCC to Ministry of Health ‘Disposal 
of Refuse’, 5 July 1924. 
47 TNA HLG 51/12, J.C. Dawes Report of Visit to Refuse Dumps of Rainham, 26 February 
1925. 
48 Romford Times, April 21 1920, p. 2. 
49 Ibid. 
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have changed by 1924, when the council again asked its Medical Officer of Health to 
investigate as the dumps ‘were a great nuisance and were going to become a further 
nuisance’.50 Unregulated dumping on private land throughout the eastern suburban 
fringes of London adjoining the Thames was one of the main sources of discontent 
and public fear about the consequences to health of exposure to urban waste. It was 
around this question that ideas about a technological fix to dumping as a practice 
emerged and were contested. In the long-term these debates would see the 
emergence of controlled tipping (sanitary landfill) as the dominant technological form 
of an urban waste regime that would ultimately endure through the rest of the 
twentieth century. 
 
Waste Disposal and Environmental Justice 
 
As Richard Rodger and Genevieve Massard-Guilbaud have recently argued, cities 
are a site where social and environmental justice issues often meet.51 One might 
also add that the urban fringe is commonly an important space in which such issues 
manifest themselves. A key question that arose from the politics of tipping was the 
justice of the export of metropolitan refuse and its associated risks to the suburbs. 
The absence of statutory rights for local authorities in controlling the use of land in 
their areas was a particular source of tensions. Tottenham Parliamentary Borough 
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declared that it was ‘extraordinary that no statute exists to prevent private ground 
being made use of for the deposit of refuse to the serious distraction of the amenity 
that occupiers of neighbouring premises are subjected to and the deterioration in 
value that owners have to tolerate’, added to which was the ‘menace to health’ which 
had ‘resulted both from an invasion of the property by rats and flies’.52 The 
contradiction of trying to promote local health while being a site for dumping the 
refuse of the urban refuse system motivated Hayes Urban District Council when it 
passed a resolution complaining that: ‘Whilst endeavouring to assist the Ministry in 
raising the standard of health of the inhabitants, the Council find themselves 
thwarted by mountains of London filth being dumped in the district by Contractors 
who undertake to keep London Boroughs clear’.53 The spatial injustice of this 
prompted some like the Medical Officer of Orsett Rural District that urban authorities 
should be compelled erect dust destructors to deal with their own waste in situ.54 In 
October 1929, a joint conference of those suburban district councils affected was 
called by Essex County Council.55 The county Medical Officer of Health, who had 
been instructed to re-examine the Essex riverside dumps, reported that they were 
undoubtedly a menace to health. The Chairman of the ECC expressed his anger that 
his county was suffering the consequences of metropolitan failure: 
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[T]his is an outrageous scandal which has been created by the 
metropolitan boroughs of London in dumping millions of tons of 
household refuse on the north shores of the Thames, there to become 
an intolerable nuisance. The position from our point of view has 
become extremely serious. London is dumping over 100,000 tons of 
refuse on the north shore of the Thames yearly. One of the dumps is 
already 90ft high. It has been accumulating over a large number of 
years, and is the curse of the village of Rainham.  
 
The conference agreed a resolution demanding legislation that would in effect have 
enabled local authorities to exercise a veto power over the use of private land as 
dumping ground.56  
 
The question of environmental justice and the establishment of a local veto over 
dumping moved the antinomies of waste disposal into the realm of outright spatial 
contradictions. It also further illustrates the limits of ‘individuation’ in understanding 
the politics of risk in this period. The injustices of dumping were conceptualised in 
terms of spatial communities of risk and responsibility. Within localities the 
acceptability of risk was often determined by local officials, whose status and 
legitimacy arose from their claims to protect the health of particular places and 
spaces. The key point, however, is that the demands of suburban areas for a right to 
veto sites for dumping by metropolitan authorities could not be met without creating a 
crisis of waste disposal (and of urban reproduction) for the metropolis. The 
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consistent rejection of such powers by central government throughout the inter-war 
period demonstrated the latent priority given to the reproduction of metropolitan 
space, and exposed the limits to the priority accorded to public health. The 
Departmental Committee on London Cleansing firmly rejected local veto powers, for 
example, advising the creation of a centralised waste collection and disposal 
authority for the entire metropolis as an alternative.  
 
However, proposals for centralisation themselves met with fierce resistance from 
Metropolitan Boroughs who were viscerally opposed to centralisation, a position 
which reflected long-standing antagonism between the boroughs and the London 
County Council.57 Lambeth Borough told the Ministry of Health that any centralisation 
was ‘inadvisable and impractical’.58 The City of Westminster dismissed the idea of 
either centralised waste collection or an LCC rate for the costs of disposal.59 These 
spatial conflicts between suburban districts and central urban areas also revealed 
social conflicts of class. Responding to the failure to obtain local veto the Labour MP 
for Romford, H.T. Muggeridge, pointed angrily to the great danger to the health 
presented by dumps to working-class suburban communities. 60  In January, during 
discussion of the Rural Amenities Bill, he had attacked the metropolitan boroughs in 
class terms: 
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The offenders were the City of Westminster and the City of London 
and Kensington. The very places which looked with horror upon Poplar 
were the places that offended, and rather than spend money on the 
means of getting rid innocuously of the stuff, which was a danger to 
health, not in their own neighbourhood but in the neighbourhood of his 
constituents, they would barter to get rid of it in this way.61 
Legislation was, he suggested, necessary to equalise the power of smaller local 
authorities to challenge the rich, powerful Metropolitan Boroughs and their 
contractors to conduct what he called a ‘premeditated uglification’, which undermined 
the original reasons for the construction of ‘these would-be model cottages of the 
working classes’ at Becontree.62 Dartford Rural District Council wrote to the Ministry 
furious with the failure of the Departmental Committee to deliver ‘any concrete and 
constructive proposal to deal with the indiscriminate dumping of London refuse’.63 
The contradictions of the urban refuse disposal and the needs of everyday 
reproduction of the city thus reveal the spatial, social and environmental justice 
issues that are at work behind the politics of risk. We should not to assume that 
because perceptions of risks to health are sometimes sensed through, or articulated 
in the context of the individual body, they do not also reveal the operation of the 
social relations of everyday. It is within the field of everyday life that risk can best be 
placed in order to understand more fully the context within which it operates and the 
contradictions that emerge from efforts to stabilise the discourse of risk. 
 
                                                          
61 Romford Times, 26 February 1930. 
62 Ibid. 
63 TNA HLG 51/8 Public Cleansing (London), letter from RDC Dartford, 7 November 1930. 
 25 
Risk and Everyday Life 
 
How can we understand the relations between the expert production of knowledge of 
risk and the everyday world of social relations within which it was embedded? To 
what extent is the picture of expert monopolisation of the right to decide acceptable 
risk investigated by Beck adequate? There is a complex problem here of the relative 
importance to be accorded scientific knowledge production and the respective roles 
of citizens and workers in responding to and, on occasion, contesting that 
knowledge. Whereas Beck tends to view scientific knowledge production as an 
immanent process of self-critique (by which scientific expertise produces public 
doubt and unpredictability with respect to its own foundations) we wish to read risk 
discourse within the wider ‘semantic field’ of everyday life.  
 
Here we follow to some extent Henri Lefebvre’s account of the semantic field of 
everyday life in his second volume of The Critique of Everyday Life.64 For Lefebvre 
the idea of the semantic field represented an attempt to express the limits of 
language and signification, the idea that the study of discourse or signification, in 
itself was insufficient in order to capture the totality of relations embedded in the 
everyday. Lefebvre saw language as what he termed a ‘mediation’ and therefore 
insufficient in itself as an explanation of everyday experience.65 Whilst Lefebvre 
rejected structuralism, then, this did not imply a reduction of social life to the process 
of signification. It is this relational, mediating character to language which to some 
degree exemplifies the very concept of the everyday. 
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Similarly, we wish to read risk not just as a problem of language, discourse, or 
knowledge production, but in Lefebvrean terms as a ‘mediating’ language embedded 
in a particular space and an ensemble of social practices whose day to day 
reproduction was already dependent upon certain pre-existing social relations and 
material processes. We believe that Lefebvre’s account of the ‘everyday’ and of the 
semantic field offers a powerful means by which to express the relationality between 
discourses, space and the social.  We are attracted to it precisely because it is 
attentive to the totality of relations, practices and materialities involved in a politics of 
risk, rather than falling back into a prioritisation of discourse over other forces. From 
within the semantic field of the everyday the synthesis and appropriation of medical 
discourses should be seen as normal, in which the material practices and social 
relations of everyday life opens up antinomies; spaces for the contestation of 
expertise. Viewing risk as one discourse within a wider semantic field embedded in 
space and the social relations of everyday life enables us to see a more complex 
political ecology at work in risk society than we feel is present in Beck’s narrative 
scientific knowledge production. 
 
In the case of tipping, by the 1920s the discursive production of hazard already relied 
on a complex inter-textual combination of elements from public sanitary science, 
laboratory-based bacteriology and popular conceptions of hazard.  A complaint 
made by the London County Council to the Ministry of Health in 1924 regarding 
tipping in the vicinity of the Becontree estate is typical of the generic features of risk 
deployed against tipping as a practice: 
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Tips of the kind indicated [crude tips] give rise to offensive smells due 
not only to the foul character of the deposits, but also to the 
combustion or partial combustion of the heaps with the accompanying 
destructive distillation of animal and vegetable matter. The danger to 
health from dust blown from these heaps in dry windy weather and 
also from breeding of flies is also one which cannot but be viewed with 
some apprehension as the population of the vicinity grows. Moreover, 
the presence of rats, which find in the heaps an abundant food supply, 
as well as the pollution of ditches and watercourses are matters which 
should be borne in mind.66 
 
This exemplifies four legitimate risks: the danger from dust; the nuisance cause by 
smells and ‘complaints of sickness due to this cause’; the fly danger, and the 
‘potential danger’ presented by rats.67  Together they form the network of concerns 
and fears that might prima facie constitute elements of the risk society in practice. 
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We shall investigate to what extent this should be taken to be the case later in this 
article. 
 
The first legitimate risk, ‘offensive smells’, is claimed to arise from both from 
putrefactive processes and from the spontaneous combustion of refuse heaps. This 
suggests the continuing influence of sanitary accounts of disease, which had been a 
major component in arguments for incineration before 1914.68 Exposure to the 
noxious smells of putrefactive substances is almost invariably the main risks 
associated tipping, in both popular and official responses. Complaining about the 
nearby Dagenham refuse dumps, Rainham Council officers argued that ‘the smells 
had something to do with the infectious diseases in the village.’69 Sanitary knowledge 
continued to frame the hazards of refuse, even in the context of the growing 
influence of bacteriology. Sometimes this was seen in implicit associations of 
particular events and the environmental impact of dumping. For example, it was 
noted in the Romford Times that T. H. Hughes of Dagenham, who ‘understood that 
there had recently been two deaths from diphtheria’, was careful to add that ‘he did 
not say that the smells were the cause of this, but it did not help matters.’70 The 
continuing centrality of smell in accounts of the risks of tipping points to the 
materiality and affective content of such discourse, embedded as they are in 
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everyday physical and affective experiences of the environment, such as disgust. 
This warns us against a reduction of ‘risk’ to an immanent development of medical 
discourse that fails to interrogate its wider social meaning. 
 
The second concern expressed above combined dust and flies as vectors of disease 
and illustrates the influence of a bacteriological theory of disease. We do not wish to 
reopen the discussion on the character or chronology of the ‘Bacteriological 
Revolution’ here.71 We do, however, wish to point to the complex, inter-textual ways 
in which bacteriology was employed in the public debate on waste disposal. For 
example, bacteriological accounts of disease were certainly an increasingly 
important component of understandings of the risks associated with dumping 
between the wars. In Bugs and the Victorians, John Clark has observed how ‘in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, the house fly came to embody fears for 
the mental, moral and physical well-being of nations that were intent on populating 
robust empires’.72 Secular rationalism, Clark argues, influenced by bacteriology, 
placed great emphasis on the fly as vector for germs and an ecological connection 
between centres of population and their wastes that needed to be managed, or 
preferably exterminated.73 Bacteriology also placed great emphasis on the spatiality 
of risk, which is of particular interest to us here. ‘Through the agency of the fly’, Clark 
writes, ‘rubbish – the fundament of modernity – was revisited upon humanity. The fly 
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traversed boundaries: it transported human refuse, which had been deposited on 
rural ‘wasteland’, back to village homes’.74 After 1914, it was no longer a few village 
homes that were under threat, but the very suburban housing projects designed in 
part to address public health problems of the modern city. Together, the fly and the 
dump presented contradictions that urgently required resolution if they were not to 
undermine the progressive claims of suburbanisation. Similarly, the rat population 
was a constant source of fear, both as an implied vector of disease, but also as a 
concern with the wider ecological impact of the refuse tips.  
 
The consciousness of the wider ecological impact of tipping points towards the co-
existence of popular discourse of risk alongside, and integrated into, expert 
knowledge. Sometimes this included the reported presence at tips of ‘plagues’ of 
crickets, weeds and other pests generally.75 Similarly fear about the pollution of 
water courses points toward worries about the wider environmental impact of tipping. 
Such wider concerns were rarely central to medical discourse, but more widely they 
were commonly reported and need to be taken account of. Knowledge of risk did not 
emerge simply from the internal disputes between sanitary and bacteriological 
approaches to public medicine, but also took account of wide cultural fears. The co-
existence of risks with different epistemic foundations exemplifies the inter-textual 
character of risk discourse in the field of everyday life. This discourse of risk was a 
contingent ensemble of discourses within a semantic field that could be produced, 
contested, deconstructed and reassembled. It is this wider field in which scientific 
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knowledge operated that would make risk discourse subject to appropriation by 
counter-hegemonic forces.  
 
At the same time, however, is apparent that, viewed in itself, the medical discourse 
of refuse disposal produced by expert knowledge did involve a reflexive bifurcation 
between the environmental approaches of sanitary medicine and the bacteriological 
accounts of the new laboratory medicine. This is superficially similar to Beck’s 
account of the operation of scientific knowledge in the risk society. However, the 
presence of this antinomy needs to be understood in the context of the reproduction 
of urban space indicated above. Sanitary science did not simply disappear with the 
‘rise’ of bacteriology, but as we have seen here was being incorporated into a new 
discourse of risk.76 Sanitary science and the new bacteriology could act both to 
reproduce and to negate one another but whether this happened was contingent 
upon the ideological positioning of the actors deploying them and the wider social 
and economic relations within which discourses of risk were embedded. 
 
Controlled-tipping and the Contestation of Risk  
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Controlled tipping emerged between the wars as a way of reconciling the needs of 
urban areas with the necessity of exposing the suburban fringe to urban refuse. It 
was a means of mitigating the risks of tipping while reproducing urban space and the 
waste regime on which it depended.77 Yet, controlled tipping was a controversial 
technological fix that remained contested throughout the twentieth century, 
particularly in those localities in which dumps were sited. The contestation of 
controlled tipping did not emerge in the way Beck suggests should occur in risk 
society, i.e. from the reflexive scientific demonstration of controlled tipping to be 
inadequate to the task it had been set. Instead, contestation emerged from within the 
already contradictory framing of risk discourse within everyday life. This discourse 
was complex, inter-textual, and open to contradiction, contestation and 
transformation.  
 
Following the creation of the Ministry of Health after the First World War the attention 
given to urban waste disposal by central government greatly increased.78 While a 
good deal of attention had been paid to the issue in the pre-war era, much critical 
decision making had been largely left in the hands of local and municipal authorities 
particularly when it came to questions of technological choices regarding disposal.79 
It was to municipalities that the boosters of such innovations as the ‘dust-destructor’ 
spoke in their literature.80 After the First World War, the Ministry of Health appears to 
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have increased the direct monitoring and survey of local activities, and intervened in 
behind-the-scenes discussions about the most appropriate systems of disposal. It 
became the agency most directly involved in negotiating between the interests of 
different localities, and was in the strongest position regarding expertise to decide 
questions regarding appropriate  technological solutions. As an instance of this 
centralisation, in 1922, it issued a circular giving technical advice on basic standards 
for a system of ‘controlled’ refuse tipping, including standards for depth of tipping 
face; the depth of covering material, the length of time refuse on a dump-site could 
be left exposed, and instructions regarding the proper control of smells and pests. 
This ‘Ministry circular’ became the official basis of ‘controlled tipping’, and was widely 
adopted as the basis of metropolitan boroughs’ contracts with private contractors.  
 
Bacteriology quickly came to play a central role in the legitimisation of controlled 
tipping as a ‘new’ technology, and its legitimation as risk free. Advocates of 
controlled tipping built their claims for the superiority of controlled tipping around the 
epistemic claim that biological sciences had rendered epidemiological conceptions of 
disease redundant. One of the leading authors of professional manuals on waste 
disposal of the period, A.L. Thompson, excoriated opponents of controlled tipping for 
clinging to an ‘obsolete etiology’. He argued that incineration was the most sanitary 
method of dealing with refuse ‘because of the protection it is supposed to afford 
against hypothetical epidemics’.81 He claimed that reliance on only one method of 
disposal was outdated and that even ‘separation, or utilisation’, had ‘come under the 
lash of those who, for the sake of public hygiene, would make complete incineration 
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compulsory’.82 Thompson conceded that, ‘we cannot justify fly-breeding, rat 
harbouring, nuisance-creating tips, but we can advocate and defend, offence-free 
schemes of land reclamation by means of town refuse, because the principle of 
economically restoring waste ground to usefulness is a sound one. So too, is the 
disposal of refuse in the cheapest manner consistent with environmental hygiene’83 
He went on: 
 
Although controlled tipping as a method of efficient refuse disposal is not quite 
new, it is only comparatively recently that it has been lifted into the 
prominence that we now find it. It has had and still has, though in diminishing 
numbers, its critics. Medical officers and others, who are concerned more 
primarily with the hygienic side of local government administration than the 
strictly economic, required to be convinced that the method carried no 
detrimentalities with it.84 
 
For advocates of controlled tipping the discourse of risk became a struggle between 
old and new, superior and inferior, knowledge. The objective was to render 
controlled tipping the perfect means of reconciling the contradictory needs of urban 
reproduction and suburban health. By claiming that bacteriology could render tipping 
safe, advocates of controlled tipping sought to neutralise the everyday operation of 
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sanitary discourse. However, the inter-textuality of the semantic field in which risk 
was produced was to prove resistant to such challenges. 
 
Controlled tipping emerged as an attempt to reconcile the particular competing 
interests of spatially distinct communities while at a general level securing the 
reproduction of urban social life. It was an attempt to legitimise the return to a form of 
disposal that medical and professional discourse had previously worked hard to 
delegitimise. It is an example of a technological fix that materialised an attempt to 
smooth over contradictions at both the levels of social relations and scientific 
discourse.85 The reconciliation of these contradictions was, however, far from 
straightforward. The bacteriological legitimation of controlled tipping was forced to 
enter an existing sematic field of everyday understandings of the risks of refuse 
disposal. The subsequent contestation of controlled tipping reveals the extent to 
which risk discourse was contingent upon this pre-existing field. 
 
For example, the claim that controlled tipping would be more economic than existing 
systems of incineration was contested by appropriating risk. This occurred in 
arguments that followed the Salford Corporation’s proposal to adopt controlled 
tipping in the 1930s. In Salford, arguments for technological change were explicitly 
driven by the search for economies.  A report by the Corporation’s Economy Sub-
Committee found that controlled tipping would save £13,000 per annum over 
incineration, and drew on the example of Bradford Corporation’s successful 
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pioneering of the practice.86 On the basis of the Ministry of Health’s annual report, 
Public Cleansing, the Sub-Committee reported that ‘where the method of disposal is 
by means of incineration the cost is high, whereas the cost of disposal by controlled 
tipping is comparatively low’, and observed that a visit to Bradford’s controlled tips 
had demonstrated that there was ‘no danger to the health of the community ensued 
from the adoption of controlled tipping’.87 However, there were significant divisions 
within the Corporation itself over the risks of tipping. Councillor Milward attacked the 
report’s conclusions because ‘no regard had been paid the question of true economy 
which dealt with the health of the citizens of Salford’.88 Councillor Webb similarly 
argued that controlled tipping could only be regarded as an interim solution; the 
Corporation covered only 5000 acres and ‘if they used up the whole of the available 
land in the city for tipping, at the end of the period they would have to go back to 
incineration’.89 Furthermore ‘a certain amount of material should always be 
destroyed by incineration’.90 Responding to such fears the proponents of tipping 
proceeded to deploy the legitimating potential of ‘objectivist’ science. The Salford 
Cleansing Department conducted a series of public experiments at its Stott Lane tip 
in Pendleton that were designed to reassure the public.91 The Salford City Reporter 
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reported in terms designed to highlight the mitigation and elimination of risk: ‘The 
controlled tipping now in progress at Stott lane has been experimented with for a 
matter of about three months … Elaborate precautions are taken against vermin and 
bacteria, the workers being instructed that all holes must be sealed up, thus 
obviating the possibility of vermin’.92 By the end of September 1932, the Sub-
committee were, on the basis of this three month experiment, pushing for universal 
adoption of controlled tipping by the Corporation and, to the obvious concern of 
residents, its deployment on local playing fields and allotments to level the land.93  
 
Suspicion of the new techniques continued to activate opposition, however. Within a 
year of completing its experiments the Salford Corporation was receiving complaints 
that ‘offensive smells were coming from the new tip at Wallness, and that rats were 
breeding there in the vicinity.94 Local property-owners were calling for compensation 
for the effect on property values, and parents were ‘blaming the controlled tip for 
fever and diphtheria cases in the neighbourhood’.95 The council asked its Medical 
Officer of Health to investigate, who found no evidence of flies or rats and declared 
that the possibility of infection was ‘scarcely within the bounds of possibility’.96 
Alderman Higginbottom declared this an ‘emphatic contradiction of the insanitary 
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effects of the controlled tips’.97 Salford’s citizens were, however, far from satisfied. In 
December 1933, the Salford City Reporter carried a letter from one resident that 
argued vehemently against controlled tipping both as an economy measure and for 
its environmental health effects.  
 
This controlled tipping is supposed to be an economy measure, but is it? The 
economy men of the Salford Council are going to find the rates have not 
benefited to the extent that they expected, and the menace of infection and 
contagion is very real. In my opinion, municipalities who have adopted this 
scheme have reverted back to Eastern practices of dumping their rubbish on 
the roadside for two and four-legged animals to scavenge amongst.98 
 
This response is indicative of the limits of seeing scientific knowledge production in 
isolation from the wider semantic field of everyday life. It was remarkably difficult, 
even with the backing of laboratory science, to establish a consensus on the risks of 
refuse disposal. Sanitary and environmental conception of risk remained active. 
Moreover, these were combined with wider discursive conceptions. In this case the 
idea that controlled tipping was akin to the uncivilised, oriental practices of the ‘East’, 
the antithesis of modernity. If risk society is characterised by expert monopolisation 
of the right to decide acceptable risk, then how can it take account of these 
contradictory popular conceptions of risk? 
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In 1934, the Conservative Member of Parliament, Sir Cooper Rawson, sparked a 
very public spat between proponents of controlled tipping and those who continued 
to claim that incineration was best way of dealing with domestic refuse. The 
argument, carried on in The Times newspaper, illustrates both the growing 
controversy surrounding refuse disposal in this period, and the difficulty facing 
attempts to legitimise controlled tipping. Rawson’s involvement is of interest 
precisely because he was willing to openly contest the right of ‘expert’ biologists and 
public cleansing superintendents to decide upon acceptable risk. Writing to The 
Times in December 1934 on the theme of ‘Controlled Tipping or Incineration’, 
Rawson observed that: 
 
It is strange in this scientific age that a committee which has been considering 
the disposal of London’s refuse can suggest no better way of dealing with it 
than “dumping”. The London Cleansing Advisory Committee, states in its 
interim report that “controlled tipping is in general to be preferred to 
incineration”. In other words, the committee advocates the continuation of the 
existing insanitary dumps, for controlled tipping is merely a polite name for 
dumping.99 
 
The idea of controlled tipping Rawson argued, was perhaps acceptable in principle, 
but in practice there could be no guarantee that the conditions laid down by the 
Ministry of Health’s 1922 circular could be either properly met or publicly verified. 
The real world was more complex than the laboratory science of bacteriology 
suggested. Controlled tipping may be risk free in principle, but the everyday practice 
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was a very different question. Only incineration could ‘safeguard the population 
against the risks of disease’.100  
 
Rawson’s claims were met with the ire, and confusion, of a growing body of 
enthusiasts for controlled tipping among local authorities. The chairman of the 
London Cleansing Advisory Committee, Reginald Brown, responded to Rawson in 
The Times, and stated that he had conflated ‘existing insanitary dumps’ which the 
committee recommended be closed with the system of controlled tipping. In short, 
Rawson didn’t understand the technology. This missed the point as Rawson made 
clear in a further letter which argued that the LCAC regarded it as a ‘presumption’ to 
have any of its conclusions questioned, and as ‘heresy to question a policy which 
has the blessing of the Ministry of Health’.101 Rawson was able to draw some 
support from among cleansing professionals who still worked partly within the frame 
of sanitary medicine. G. Watson a member of the institute of civil engineers, for 
example, argued that controlled tipping might be appropriate in isolated rural areas, 
but could hardly be appropriate to the needs of urban refuse disposal.102 The 
Medical Officer of Health for South West Kent expressed similar skepticism 
regarding the claims of ‘so-called “controlled” tipping’.103 In spatial terms, he argued, 
refuse dumping was simply a case of moving a problem from one place to another 
and in any case ‘some medical officers of health look upon it as indefensible from the 
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point of view of the protection of the health of the public’.104 It was also a seemingly 
irresolvable problem. As the Chairman of Romford Council remarked in 1928, it was 
to move refuse tips every time new houses were built as they would eventually run 
out of space.105 The idea that the country was running out of space for its refuse 
would continue to trouble controlled tipping throughout the rest of the century. 
 
Conclusion: Risk and the Political Ecology of Everyday Life 
For all the efforts made to legitimate it, controlled tipping remained a controversial 
technology. Its failure to finally reconcile the requirements of urban reproduction with 
public health and the wider environment is in part (along with a complex range of 
other issues) at the root of the present-day displacement of landfill as the technology 
of choice in refuse disposal.106 Today experts and government seek to legitimate 
incineration as the most environmentally friendly and lowest risk option for dealing 
with urban wastes, and again they find themselves widely under attack from a whole 
host of organised grassroots anti-incineration movements.107 If anything the politics 
of risk associated with refuse disposal is better organised than ever before, and 
there is even greater skepticism about expert accounts of the environmental impact 
of refuse disposal technologies. 
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In this article we have sought to critique Beck’s articulation of the ‘risk society’ on the 
basis of a detailed empirical engagement with his analytical claims rather than 
engaging in a chronological critique. We have done this precisely because we feel 
that, while they provide a crucial historical context, those critiques that focus on the 
chronological claims for risk society fail to fully engage with, or revise, what the 
fundamentals of Beck’s theoretical contribution, which are to be found in its 
conceptual apparatus. We would not claim that we have demonstrated that these 
claims are ‘wrong’, which in a short empirical article of this kind would be impossible 
in any case. Beck’s development of the risk society concept is too rich simply to 
collapse because it does not fit a single, very particular historical example. Rather 
we have sought to test its limits in a particular historical context. As a minimum we 
would claim that there is little evidence so far that would support pushing the risk 
society back into the early twentieth century, leave alone the nineteenth century as 
has been suggested, and that our example argues against doing so. 
 
However, we do think that there are grounds to go beyond this minimal conclusion, 
or, at least to suggest that it is possible to enrich the risk society thesis. For instance, 
we have argued that the example of inter-war refuse disposal raises questions about 
the adequacy of the concept of ‘individuation’. Public comprehension of the risks 
associated with refuse tipping does not appear suggest that these were articulated or 
perceived as particularly individuated, even though the example we have used was 
not a workplace hazard, but a much more general public risk that might be assumed 
to better fit the model of a ‘democratic risk’. Indeed, it is clear that the risks of tipping 
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were articulated through senses of place and community in politics that included, but 
were not limited to, class identities. 
 
Moreover, we have argued that any account of the politics of risk should engage with 
the politics of space and the capitalist demands of urban reproduction. We have 
suggested that there was a political ecology at work in the siting of refuse disposal 
facilities such as controlled tips in which the requirements of urban reproduction 
were privileged. It was this privileging of urban space that was contested by those 
communities affected by refuse disposal. Class is not the only way in which the 
exploitative demands of capitalist accumulation is expressed, and this only becomes 
apparent when activities such as waste disposal are viewed from the perspective of 
the everyday. The political ecology of risk remained ultimately rooted in the social 
relations of urban capitalism and the processes, political and economic, of their daily 
reproduction. 
 
We would agree with Sellars and Melling who have recently argued that the ‘ready 
equations of knowledge with power like Foucault’s’ are inadequate to explaining the 
actual political operation of risk.108 When thinking about the role of medicine and 
science in the production of knowledge of risks, we would argue that this should not 
be interpreted as an isolated discourse driven by immanent processes of the kind 
suggested by Beck’s account of ‘reflexive modernisation’. Rather we wish to see 
medical discourses and their material manifestations in technologies (controlled 
tipping) in the context of the ensemble of social relations, material practice and 
ideology. Only in this context do the unerring efforts made by experts and political 
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elites to reconcile the political economy of a privileged urban space with the complex 
demands of the semantic field of the everyday make sense. It was far from easy for 
experts to impose a monopolistic vision of risk and its mitigation. Indeed, it was 
precisely through the antinomies generated through the everyday that it was possible 
to contest and modify scientific knowledge production. Rather than a process of the 
immanent self-transcendence of medico-scientific claims, then, we see an active 
contestation of those claims between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces 
within the semantic field of the everyday. Indeed, we suggest that attention to the 
conceptual apparatus of the everyday is one way in which it may be possible to 
move ahead in understanding the complex and unstable relations between 
professional and quotidian knowledge.  
